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Abstract 
 
The contribution highlights differences in the legal approach of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of the Council of Europe 
on the one hand, and the law of the European Union (EU) on the other 
hand, with respect to the issue of legal equality and non-discrimination, 
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with a particular focus on discrimination against LGBTI (Lesbian, Gay, Bi-
sexual, Transsexual and Intersex) people. The differences discussed are both 
general (i.e. linked in particular to the origins, development and addressees 
of the two legal systems) as well as specific (i.e. linked in particular to the 
source, reach and definition of the prohibitions of discrimination under the 
two legal systems). The Handbook on European Non-Discrimination Law 
jointly published by the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency and the Council 
of Europe’s Human Rights Court may be seen as an attempt to bring the 
two legal orders closer to each other even before the accession of the EU to 
the ECHR. 
More specifically, the differences between EU and ECHR non-discrimi-
nation law are illustrated by looking more closely at the legal rules on dis-
crimination against LGBTI people. The analysis shows that whilst discrimi-
nation against intersex people is the missing ground in both systems, dis-
crimination against transgender people raises in particular problems of 
comparison as well as the scope of law, and discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation raises issues in particular related to the different forms of 
discrimination and justification. Overall, LGBTI rights and non-discrimi-
nation came into the picture only gradually and there are still important la-
cunae, in particular with respect to intersexual and transgender people. It is 
here that soft-law can and should play an especially meaningful role. 
Against this background, the adoption by the European Parliament of a re-
port calling on the European Commission to adopt an EU Roadmap tack-
ling homophobia, transphobia and discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation and gender identity (so-called Lunacek Report) is very wel-
come. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The aim of the present contribution1 is to highlight differences in the le-
gal approach of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
adopted by the Council of Europe2 on the one hand and the law of the Eu-
                                                        
1  The author wishes to thank Ms Nelleke Koffeman, Ph.D. candidate at Leiden University 
(Netherlands), for her helpful comments on a draft version of this text. 
2  On discrimination under the ECHR in general, e.g. O. M. Arnardóttir, Equality and 
Non-discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights; J. H. Gerards, Art. 
14. Verbod van discriminatie, in: Sdu Commentaar EVRM. Rechtspraak & Commentaar, 
2013; A. Peters/D. König, Kapitel 21: Das Diskriminierungsverbot, in: O. Dörr/R. Grote/T. 
Marauhn (eds.) (Gesamtredaktion: S. Rupprecht/J. Thorn), EMRK/GG. Konkordanzkom-
mentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz, 2nd ed., Vol. II, 2013, 1301; and 
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ropean Union (EU)3 on the other, with respect to the issue of legal equality 
and non-discrimination.4 Underlying this aim is the question of how much 
room for action, in particular for standard-setting on the informal level (i.e. 
through non-binding measures) remains for the states, especially those be-
longing to the Council of Europe, in view of the perceived ever-increasing 
reach of EU law in this field. 
As has been pointed out by authors such as Besson5 and Burri6 with re-
spect to gender discrimination, by Haverkort-Speekenbrink7 with respect to 
discrimination on grounds of religion and by de Schutter8 more generally 
with respect to non-discrimination, there is a marked difference between 
the approaches of the ECHR and of EU law to the issues of equality and 
non-discrimination. This paper goes in the same direction but chooses a dif-
ferent focus, namely discrimination against LGBTI people. The paper be-
gins with a brief overview of the most important differences between the 
legal systems of the ECHR and EU law, differences that are also important 
in the context of equality and non-discrimination (see II. below). Thereafter, 
the general differences between the prohibitions of discrimination under the 
ECHR and EU law will be described (see III. below). The specific focus on 
discrimination against LGBTI people will then serve as an illustration of 
some of the main differences between ECHR and EU non-discrimination 
law (see IV. below). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
the part on Art. 14 ECHR in: C. Grabenwarter, The European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A Commentary, 2014. 
3  Generally on EU (social) non-discrimination law, e.g. E. Ellis/P. Watson, EU Anti-
Discrimination Law, 2012, and C. Tobler, The Prohibition of Discrimination in the Union’s 
Layered System of Equality Law: From Early Staff Cases to the Mangold Approach, in: A. 
Rosas/E. Levits/Y. Bot (eds.), La cour de justice et la construction de l’Europe: Analyses et 
perspectives de 60 ans de jurisprudence/The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: 
Analyses and Perspectives on 60 Years of Case-law, 2013, 443. 
4  Very generally on equality and non-discrimination: e.g. S. Fredman, Discrimination 
Law, 2nd ed. 2011. 
5  S. Besson, Gender Discrimination under EU and ECHR Law: Never Shall the Twain 
Meet?, HRLR 8 (2008), 647. 
6  S. D. Burri, Towards More Synergy in the Interpretation of the Prohibition of Sex Dis-
crimination in European Law? A Comparison of Legal Contexts and Some Case Law of the 
EU and the ECHR, Utrecht Law Review 9 (2013), 80. 
7  S. Haverkort-Speekenbrink, European Non-Discrimination Law. A Comparison of EU 
Law and the ECHR in the Field of Non-Discrimination and Freedom of Religion in Public 
Employment with an Emphasis on the Islamic Headscarf Issue, 2012, in particular 193 et seq. 
8  O. de Schutter, Discrimination under European Human Rights Law. Relevance for the 
EU Non-Discrimination Directives – An Update, available at <http://www.ab.gov.tr>. 
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II. Background and Context: Some Basic Differences 
between the ECHR and EU Law 
 
Drawing in particular on the work of the authors mentioned in the intro-
duction (though without making specific reference to them in the present 
context), this section very briefly recalls some general differences between 
the legal systems of the ECHR and the EU. 
Looking back at the origins, a first difference concerns the place of non-
discrimination law in the respective legal systems. Whilst the ECHR was 
established as a general bill of rights, including also the prohibition of dis-
crimination under Art. 14 ECHR as a particular human rights aspect with 
the function of a minimum guarantee within a larger system of the same 
type, the original European Community law was essentially economic in 
nature. The European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community 
(EEC, later renamed “Economic Community”, EC) saw the prohibition of 
discrimination under the treaties as the cornerstone of economic integration 
and as a matter of ensuring a level playing field for competition. This in-
cluded in particular discrimination on grounds of nationality, as well as the 
principle of equal pay for men and women, although the latter was formally 
part of EEC social law.9 The recognition of human rights entered Commu-
nity law only through the case-law of the European Court of Justice (for-
merly Court of Justice of the European Communities, ECJ, now Court of 
Justice of the European Union, CJEU).10 
Second, ECHR and EU law differ in terms of their development, espe-
cially with regard to the scope of the law. From the beginning, the ECHR 
had a very broad material scope, meaning that it covered many aspects of 
life. Subsequently, the Convention developed mostly through case-law, in 
particular through the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) doc-
trine of the Convention as a “living instrument” which must be interpreted 
in the light of present-day conditions. This means that much could be 
achieved through interpretation, making formal amendments to the ECHR 
or the adoption of new conventions unnecessary in many areas. This is also 
                                                        
 9  See in particular L. Imbrechts, L’égalité de rémuneration entre hommes et femmes, RTD 
Eur. 1986, 231, and C. Barnard, The Economic Objectives of Article 119, in: T. K. Hervey/D. 
O. O’Keeffe (eds.), Sex Equality Law in the European Union, 1996, 320. 
10  In the present contribution, the abbreviation CJEU is used throughout for reasons of 
simplicity, also in the pre-Lisbon context. 
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true of non-discrimination,11 where, apart from Protocol 12, there have 
been no formal changes in the ECHR. Instead, the focus has rather been on 
the implementation and enforcement of the existing law. 
In contrast, European Community law and later EU law developed very 
dynamically through Treaty revisions, the adoption of secondary law and 
case-law from the CJEU. This is particularly visible in the field of non-
discrimination law, which developed12 into a complex multi-layered system 
including some substantive prohibitions of discrimination in the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, which is the revised and 
renamed former EC Treaty), a great deal of specific secondary law on dif-
ferent types of discrimination and with different fields of application, and a 
number of General Principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination 
that were recognised by the CJEU as part of EU primary law.13 In contrast, 
there is no such general principle under the ECHR.14 
More recently, some of these principles have found expression in the 
EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) which, through the Lisbon 
Treaty revision, has been given the same legal status as the Treaties (Art. 6(1) 
TFEU) and which binds not only EU institutions but also EU Member 
States where they act within the scope of EU law (Art. 51(1) CFR, as inter-
preted by the CJEU).15 The Charter contains a specific title on “Equality” 
with provisions on a number of different aspects. However, it should be 
added that the practical value of the General Principles and of the Charter is 
limited, as in most non-discrimination cases the relevant legal framework 
continues to consist of specific rules, in particular rules to be found on the 
level of secondary law. An apparent and confusing exception is Directive 
2000/78/EC,16 in respect of which the CJEU has held that the various pro-
hibitions of discrimination mentioned in this Directive do not flow from 
the Directive itself but rather from General Principles, to which specific ex-
                                                        
11  On the development of case-law on Art. 14 ECHR, see e.g. F. Tulkens, L’évolution du 
principe de non-discrimination à la lumière de la jurisprudence de la Court européenne des 
droits de l’homme, in: J.-Y. Carlier (ed.), L’étranger face au droit. XXes journées d’études 
juridiques Jean Dabin, 2010, 193. 
12  See in particular G. More, The Principle of Equal Treatment: From Market Unifier to 
Fundamental Right, in: P. Craig/G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU law, 1st ed. 1999, 
517; M. Bell, The Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening, in: P. Craig/G. de 
Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU law, 2nd ed. 2011, 611. 
13  See also C. Tobler (note 3). 
14  See A. Peters/D. König (note 2), paras. 5 and 6. 
15  CJEU, Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, judgment of 26.2.2013, 
n.y.r. 
16  Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27.11.2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, OJ 2000 L 303/16. 
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pression is given by the Directive in the field of employment and occupa-
tion (Mangold,17 Kücükdeveci,18 Kristensen19). More recently, the Court has 
confirmed that Art. 21 CFR is sufficient in itself to confer on individuals a 
right which they may invoke (Association de médiation sociale).20 
The differences in development between the ECHR and the EU law also 
mean that new issues appeared in the two legal orders at different times. For 
example, the issue of protection against disadvantageous treatment based on 
a person’s sexual orientation arose in ECtHR case-law early on, based on an 
interpretation of the Convention that linked sexual orientation to the right 
to private life under Art. 8 ECHR (though in the first such case, Dudgeon v. 
UK21 in 1981, the ECtHR found it unnecessary also to look into Art. 14 
ECHR). Wintemute22 has argued that private life is affected in every case of 
sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination, and that Art. 14 
ECHR can, therefore, always be invoked. In contrast, the CJEU, having 
declared itself unable to include the issue under the heading of sex discrimi-
nation (Grant),23 was able to deal with questions relating to discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation arising in the Member States24 only once 
the first cases arising under Directive 2000/78/EC reached it (namely Ma-
ruko25 in 2008). Despite denying any basis of a prohibition under EC law 
before that Directive, the CJEU did refer to the case-law of the ECtHR. 
Obviously, given the dialogue between courts, the court that addresses an 
                                                        
17  CJEU, Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981. 
18  CJEU, Case C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG [2010] ECR I-
365. 
19  CJEU, Case C-476/11 HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Glennie Kristensen v. Experi-
an A/S, judgment of 26.9.2013, n.y.r. 
20  CJEU, Case C-176/12 Association de médiation sociale v. Union locale des syndicats 
CGT, Hichem Laboubi, Union départementale CGT des Bouches-du-Rhône, Confédération 
générale du travail (CGT), judgment of 15.1.2014, n.y.r. 
21  ECtHR, Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom (Application No. 7525/76), judgment of 
22.10.1981. 
22  R. Wintemute, “Within the Ambit”: How Big Is the Gap in Article 14 European Con-
vention on Human Rights?, EHRLR 9 (2004), 366; R. Wintemute, Filling the Article 14 
“Gap”: Government Ratification and Judicial Control of Protocol No. 12 ECHR, EHRLR 9 
(2004), 484. 
23  CJEU, Case C-249/96 Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd. [1998] ECR I-
621. See generally N. D. Hunter, The Sex Discrimination Argument in Gay Rights Cases, 
Journal of Law and Public Policy 2000/2001, 397. 
24  As opposed to the EU’s (previously: the Communities’) internal employment law. In 
that regard, see CJEU, Joined Cases C-122/99 P and C-125/99 P D and Sweden v. Council 
[2001] ECR I-4319. 
25  CJEU, Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen 
[2008] ECR I-1757. 
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issue for the first time has considerable power in setting the tone on the 
matter even if the legal context is not the same.26 
A third difference concerns those obliged by the ECHR and EU law. 
Whilst the ECHR binds only its Signatory States, EU law other than direc-
tives can bind both Member States and individuals, e.g. employers.27 Ac-
cordingly, individuals may be able to invoke EU law and to rely on it in 
proceedings against other individuals before national courts. Ultimately, the 
differences mentioned reflect a deeper difference in the nature of the organi-
sations behind the ECHR and EU non-discrimination law. Whilst the 
Council of Europe is an intergovernmental organisation, the European Un-
ion has largely been a supranational organisation since the Lisbon revision. 
This has consequences with respect to enforcement. Given the ability of in-
dividuals to apply to the ECtHR, the ECHR is more developed than other 
public international law. There is also ECtHR case-law on enforcement is-
sues related to discrimination, e.g. with respect to the burden of proof.28 
Nevertheless, EU law is considerably stronger, being characterised by a par-
ticularly sophisticated enforcement system. In the area of non-discrimi-
nation law, the most modern generation of EU directives contains explicit 
provisions on enforcement, dealing with, among other issues, the right to 
judicial access, the burden of proof and sanctions for discrimination. Much 
of the EU’s present enforcement law developed in the context of issues re-
lated to non-discrimination.29 
 
 
III. The Prohibition of Discrimination under the ECHR 
and EU Law 
 
With respect to the prohibition of discrimination, there are a number of 
commonalities between the ECHR and EU law, namely their foundation in 
an Aristotelian understanding of equality, the recognition that discrimina-
tion can take different forms and that discriminatory action may be justi-
                                                        
26  Compare e.g. F. G. Jacobs, Judicial Dialogue and the Cross-Fertilization of Legal Sys-
tems: The European Court of Justice, Tex. Int.’l L. J. 38 (2003), 547; M. E. Villiger, The Dia-
logue of Judges, in: C. Hohmann-Dennhardt/P. Masuch/M. Villiger (eds.), Festschrift für 
Renate Jäger. Grundrechte und Solidarität. Durchsetzung und Verfahren, 2010, 195. 
27  See e.g. C. Tobler/J. Beglinger, Essential EU Law in Charts, 3rd ed. 2014, Chart 8/3. 
28  See O. M. Arnardóttir, Non-discrimination Under Article 14 ECHR: The Burden of 
Proof, Sc. St. L. 52 (2007), 14. 
29  See C. Tobler, The Impact of Non-Discrimination Law in Developing a General Doc-
trine of Enforcement Under EU Law, in: E. Ellis/K. Benediktsdottír (eds.), Equality into Re-
ality. Action for Diversity and Non-Discrimination in Iceland, 2011, 67. 
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fied, at least in principle, though beyond that principle there is a major dif-
ference in approach between the two systems with respect to justification. 
The same is true with respect to the sources of law, the discrimination 
grounds, the scope of the prohibition of discrimination and its nature as ei-
ther a stand-alone or an accessory right. The following provides a general 
introduction to these issues, which is then illustrated in the specific context 
of discrimination against LGBTI persons. 
 
 
1. A (in principle) Unitary Source vs Multiple Sources 
 
One particularly important difference between the ECHR and EU law 
with respect to non-discrimination concerns the formal source of this pro-
hibition. In the ECHR, there is one single provision on this issue, at least as 
far as the general level is concerned, namely Art. 14 (on the level of proto-
cols to the ECHR, e.g. Art. 5 of Protocol 7, concerning equality between 
spouses, can be seen as a specific provision). Art. 14 ECHR (Prohibition of 
discrimination) provides: 
 
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall 
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”30 
 
As already stated, EU non-discrimination law is characterised by a mul-
tiplicity of sources. This is particularly true of the social field, where there 
are different legal instruments for different discrimination grounds which 
exist in addition to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the EU’s Gen-
eral Principles. In addition, these instruments reflect different stages in the 
development of the law. This is the case for sex discrimination, where the 
following specific Treaty provision and directives currently concern indi-
vidual rights (namely Art. 157 TFEU as well as Directives 79/7/EEC,31 
                                                        
30  An additional source of non-discrimination rights is the European Social Charter. 
However, compared to the Convention, it is less strong not only in terms of enforcement, but 
more fundamentally in terms of its reach among the Council of Europe’s Signatory States. For 
example, the Social Charter has not been signed and ratified by two states (namely Liechten-
stein and Switzerland) and has only been signed but not ratified by a number of others. The 
European Social Charter is not discussed in the present paper. 
31  Directive 79/7/EEC on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treat-
ment for men and women in matters of social security, OJ 1979 L 6/24. 
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2004/113/EC,32 2006/54/EC33 and 2010/41/EU;34 a proposal for a directive 
on improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of compa-
nies listed on stock exchanges and related measures35 is pending). 
In contrast, there is one single yet far-reaching directive concerning dis-
crimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin, namely Directive 
2000/43/EC.36 With respect to sexual orientation, religion or belief, disabil-
ity and age, there is the more modest Directive 2000/78/EC.37 In this field, a 
proposal for an additional directive has been pending for several years.38 
 
 
2. Grounded in an Aristotelian Understanding of Legal 
Equality 
 
Both the ECHR and EU law share a foundation in an Aristotelian under-
standing of equality, i.e. a general definition according to which legal equali-
ty means that similar situations are to be treated in the same manner and 
different situations are to be treated differently on the basis of their differ-
ence(s). Accordingly, both legal orders attribute great importance to compa-
rability, and both recognise that discrimination can result from either differ-
ent treatment of comparable situations or from the same treatment of dif-
ferent (non-comparable) situations.39 
Under the ECHR, the recent case of E.B. and others v. Austria40 is an ex-
ample where the ECtHR found discrimination based on the same treatment 
                                                        
32  Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between men 
and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ 2004 L 373/37. 
33  Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities 
and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), 
OJ 2006 L 204/23. 
34  Directive 2010/41/EU on the application of the principle of equal treatment between 
men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity and repealing Council 
Directive 86/613/EEC, OJ 2010 L 180/1. 
35  COM(2012) 614 final. 
36  Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ 2000 L 180/22. 
37  Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in em-
ployment and occupation, OJ 2000 L 303/16. 
38  Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment be-
tween persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, 
COM(2008) 426 final. 
39  CJEU, Case 13/63 Italy v. Commission [1963] ECR 165; ECtHR, Thlimmenos v. 
Greece (Application No. 34369/97), judgment of 6.4.2000. 
40  ECtHR, E.B. and Others v. Austria (Application Nos. 31913/07, 38357/07, 48098/07, 
48777/07 and 48779/07), judgment of 7.11.2013. 
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of non-comparable situations. The applicants complained that their convic-
tions for homosexual acts with consenting adolescents within the age brack-
et of 14 to 18 years under Austrian criminal law remained on their criminal 
record even though the ECtHR had found the relevant provision of Austri-
an criminal law to be discriminatory and the Austrian Constitutional Court 
had annulled it. The ECtHR reiterated that the right not to be discriminated 
against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is 
not only violated in cases of differential treatment, but also when states, 
without an objective and reasonable justification, fail to treat differently 
persons whose situations are significantly different. In the present case, the 
ECtHR found that the failure to treat the applicants differently from other 
persons also convicted of a criminal offence, but where the offence in ques-
tion had not been quashed by the Constitutional Court or otherwise abol-
ished, amounted to discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. 
Overall, it would appear that the ECHR is stronger when it comes to 
recognising discrimination resulting from same treatment. In EU social law, 
so far there is an explicit provision actually demanding different treatment 
only with respect to discrimination on grounds of disability (namely Art. 5 
of Directive 2000/78/EC, on reasonable accommodation). 
 
 
3. An Accessory vs a Stand-Alone Prohibition 
 
One particularly important difference between the ECHR and EU law 
with regard to non-discrimination concerns the basic nature of the respec-
tive laws: For those (numerous) Council of Europe states to which Protocol 
12 does not apply, Art. 14 ECHR only guarantees an accessory right to 
non-discrimination, namely in the exercise of other rights under the Con-
vention or any of its protocols, though within this framework the scope of 
the right to non-discrimination is very broad, as shown below.41 Until 
about the year 2000, where the Court found a violation of another right, it 
tended to refrain from also examining the existence of discrimination under 
Art. 14 ECHR. In contrast, EU law contains many free-standing and specif-
ic non-discrimination provisions, i.e. provisions that grant a right to non-
discrimination on their own, though usually within a limited field of appli-
cation. 
 
 
                                                        
41  See III. 5. below. 
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4. Discrimination Grounds 
 
Most of the concepts concerning different forms of discrimination are 
tied to specific discrimination grounds. It is here that a particularly notice-
able difference between the ECHR and EU law becomes apparent. Art. 14 
ECHR is worded openly, i.e. it does not contain a closed list of discrimina-
tion grounds but only lists examples (“on any ground such as …”). Accord-
ingly, it was possible for the ECtHR to recognise, and thereby add, grounds 
not explicitly listed or even to state that it is ultimately not necessary to de-
termine on what ground a difference is based.42 
In contrast, EU law outside its internal employment law (which is not 
discussed in this contribution) has traditionally been based on a closed sys-
tem with a limited number of discrimination grounds, as enumerated in the 
statutory prohibitions of discrimination that developed over time. Today, 
Art. 21 CFR is different (“any discrimination based on any ground such as 
…”), though it is important to remember that the Charter binds the Mem-
ber States only when they act within the scope of EU law. The meaning and 
reach of the different discrimination grounds under the ECHR and under 
EU law will be discussed further in the specific context of discrimination 
against LGBTI persons. 
 
 
5. The Material Scope of the Prohibition of Discrimination 
 
Given its link to the ECHR as a whole, the material scope of Art. 14 
ECHR has always been very broad. It has been further broadened through 
the ECtHR’s case-law. First, any additional rights which fall within the gen-
eral scope of the Convention and which the state in question has voluntarily 
decided to provide are also covered.43 Secondly, the application of Art. 14 
ECHR does not necessarily presuppose the violation of one of the substan-
tive rights guaranteed by the Convention. Rather, it is sufficient but also 
necessary for the facts of the case to fall “within the ambit” of the Conven-
tion.44 With respect to issues not covered by the Convention, the prohibi-
                                                        
42  ECtHR, Rasmussen v. Denmark (Application No. 8777/79), judgment of 28.11.1984. 
Gerards has argued that the Court’s approach to the recognition of discrimination grounds is 
inconsistent and confused; cf. J. Gerards, The Discrimination Grounds of Article 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, HRLR 13 (2013), 99. 
43  The leading case on this matter is ECtHR, Carson v. UK (Application No. 42184/05), 
judgment of 16.3.2010. 
44  E.g. ECtHR, Andrejeva v. Latvia (Application No. 55707/00), judgment of 18.2.2009; 
see e.g. J. H. Gerards (note 2), C.1.1 Accessoir karakter; further e.g. A. Baker, The Enjoyment 
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tion of discrimination under the European Social Charter may be applica-
ble. 
In contrast, the material scope of specific non-discrimination provisions 
in EU law is often quite limited and uneven. For example, whilst Directive 
2000/78/EC only applies in the field of employment and occupation, the 
material scope of Directive 2000/43/EC is considerably broader, also in-
cluding e.g. employment-related social security, further access and supply of 
goods and services, and other matters such as education and social ad-
vantages. The only exception to this is the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, which applies in the full scope of EU law. The reach 
of the different non-discrimination rules will be further discussed in the 
specific context of discrimination against LGBTI persons. 
 
 
6. Different Forms of Discrimination 
 
Both the ECHR and EU law recognise that different forms of discrimi-
nation exist. In particular, discrimination can be either obvious or overt (di-
rect discrimination), or covert (indirect discrimination), though the devel-
opment of the concept of indirect discrimination began much earlier in the 
EU (then the EEC) than under ECHR law and today remains considerably 
more developed under EU law. 
In the ECHR, the ECtHR’s case-law definition of indirect discrimination 
is a comparatively recent one (Hoogendijk45 in 2005), and it appears to be 
applied only relatively hesitantly and in limited contexts (namely in the 
context of the so-called Roma school segregation cases D.H. and Others v. 
Czech Republic,46 Oršuš and Others v. Croatia47 and Horváth and Kiss v. 
Hungary48 concerning indirect discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin, 
though the latter had been argued before the Court as a direct discrimina-
                                                                                                                                  
of Rights and Freedoms: A New Conception of the “Ambit” under Article 14 EHRC, M.L.R. 
69 (2006), 714. 
45  ECtHR, Hoogendijk v. The Netherlands (Application No. 8641/00), judgment of 
6.1.2005. 
46  ECtHR, D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic (Application No. 57325/00), judgment of 
13.11.2007. 
47  ECtHR, Oršuš and Others v. Croatia (Application No. 15766/03), judgment of 
16.3.2010. 
48  ECtHR, Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary (Application No. 11146/11), judgment of 
29.1.2013. The attorney-at-law for the applicants in this case was L. Farkas, the author of the 
report on “Segregation of Roma Children in Education Addressing Structural Discrimination 
through the Race Equality Directive” (for the European Commission), 2007. 
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tion case).49 Under the ECHR, the concept of indirect discrimination is im-
portant despite the above-mentioned open catalogue of discrimination 
grounds under Art. 14 ECHR because of the ECtHR’s differentiated ap-
proach to justification (to be discussed in the section on justification below). 
In the EU, the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination 
originates from CJEU case-law.50 Today, the most recent generation of sec-
ondary EU social non-discrimination law contains legal definitions of these 
concepts. For example, under Art. 2(a) of Directive 2004/113/EC direct dis-
crimination on grounds of sex exists 
 
“where one person is treated less favourably, on grounds of sex, than another 
is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation”. 
 
Art. 2(b) of the same Directive defines indirect sex discrimination as re-
ferring to the situation 
 
“where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put per-
sons of one sex at a particular disadvantage compared with persons of the other 
sex, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legiti-
mate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary”. 
 
The distinction between direct and indirect discrimination will be further 
discussed below in the specific context of discrimination against LGBTI 
persons. 
In addition, the most recent generation of EU social non-discrimination 
law also mentions harassment and the instruction to discriminate. For the 
former, there are legal definitions. To take the example of Directive 
2004/113/EC again, Art. 2(c) describes harassment related to sex as a situa-
tion 
 
“where an unwanted conduct related to the sex of a person occurs with the 
purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidat-
ing, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment”. 
 
As a result of the CJEU’s case-law, there are also further concepts such as 
discrimination by association,51 and there is a debate on whether a lack of 
                                                        
49  See L. Farkas’ comments on the following blog website, with a link to the submission 
and applicants’ observations: A. Timmer, Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary: A Strong New Roma 
School Segregation Case, Strasbourg Observers, 6.2.2013, available at <http:// 
strasbourgobservers.com>. 
50  C. Tobler, Indirect Discrimination. A Case Study into the Development of the Legal 
Concept of Indirect Discrimination under EC Law, 2005; J. H. Gerards (note 2), C.1.5.2 Ges-
chiedenis van erkenning van het concept van indirect onderscheid. 
51  CJEU, Case C-303/06 S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-5603. 
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reasonable accommodation, in particular in the context of disability and 
against the background of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, must be seen as discrimination.52 Both the ECHR and EU 
law also account for the legal concept of positive action, which is often con-
strued as an exception to equal treatment even though in the present writer’s 
view it is more logical to see it as “the other side” of equality. Whilst in EU 
law positive action is more developed, the case-law of the ECtHR appears 
to have the advantage that, depending on the situation, positive action may 
actually be demanded, rather than only allowed.53 
 
 
7. An Open vs a Closed System of Justification 
 
Both the ECHR and EU law accept that, in principle, discrimination can 
be justified. Strictly speaking, there is, in fact, no discrimination where there 
is justification. As long as justification has not been examined, there is at the 
most prima facie discrimination. 
With respect to Art. 14 ECHR, the ECtHR stated generally in e.g. Val-
lianatos and Others v. Greece54 (para. 76): 
 
“[I]n order for an issue to arise under Article 14 there must be a difference in 
the treatment of persons in comparable situations. Such a difference of treatment 
is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification; in other 
words, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable rela-
tionship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to 
be realised. The Contracting State enjoys a margin of appreciation in assessing 
whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a 
different treatment […].”55 
 
                                                        
52  See e.g. D. Schiek/L. Waddington/M. Bell (eds.), Cases, Materials and Text on National, 
Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law, 2007, 632. In a broader context; 
outside the issue of disability, see e.g. J. Ringelheim/E. Bribosia/I. Rorive, Reasonable Ac-
commodation for Religious Minorities: A Promising Concept for European Antidiscrimina-
tion Law?, Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 17 (2010), 137. 
53  J. H. Gerards (note 2), C.I.1. Positieve discriminatie en voorkeursbeleid. 
54  ECtHR, Vallianatos and Others v. Greece (Application Nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09), 
judgment of 7.11.2013. On this case, see e.g. the annotation by N. Koffeman, EHRC 2014/34. 
55  More generally on the issue of the margin of appreciation, see e.g. N. Bamforth, Fami-
lies But Not (Yet) Marriages? Same-sex Partners and the Developing European Convention 
“Margin of Appreciation”, Child & Family Law Quarterly 23 (2011), 128. 
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However, according to the ECtHR’s case-law, discrimination on certain 
grounds is more suspect than on others (e.g. Karner v. Austria).56 More spe-
cifically, differences in treatment on the basis of birth out of wedlock, sex, 
sexual orientation, race and ethnic origin, nationality and disability must be 
justified by “particularly weighty reasons” or “very weighty reasons” and 
be proportionate, i.e. there must a reasonable relationship of proportionali-
ty between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised; more 
specifically, the means must be suitable and necessary. In other cases, there 
is the broader possibility of objective and reasonable justification, which 
requires the pursuit of a legitimate aim and proportionality and leaves the 
States a certain margin of appreciation. According to Danisi,57 very weighty 
reasons are increasingly required for justification under the ECHR. At the 
same time, it has been noted by Koffeman58 that the Court’s approach is not 
always consistent, especially where a wide margin “is usually allowed to the 
State under the Convention when it comes to general measures of economic 
or social strategy” (e.g. Schalk and Kopf,59 para. 97).60 
Under EU law, what justification is available depends on the legal provi-
sion in question. Not all non-discrimination provisions mention justifica-
tion. It also depends on the type of discrimination, direct or indirect (rather 
than on the ground as under Art. 14 ECHR). Traditionally, direct discrimi-
nation can be justified only on the basis of specific grounds enumerated in 
the relevant EU law (known as statutory derogations).61 For indirect dis-
crimination, the very definition of this concept as defined under EU law 
includes the broader element of objective justification. There are, however, 
exceptions where objective justification is also available for direct discrimi-
nation. This concerns notably age discrimination under Art. 6(1) of Di-
rective 2000/78/EC and sex discrimination under Art. 4(5) of Directive 
2004/113/EC. Furthermore, the range of statutory discrimination grounds 
may differ in different legal frameworks (compare e.g. Directives 
                                                        
56  See e.g. ECtHR, Karner v. Austria (Application No. 40016/98), judgment of 24.7.2003; 
D. Schiek/L. Waddington/M. Bell (note 52), 36 et seq. 
57  C. Danisi, How Far Can the European Court of Human Rights Go in the Fight against 
Discrimination? Defining New Standards in Its Nondiscrimination Jurisprudence, Interna-
tional Journal of Constitutional Law 9 (2011), 793. 
58  N. Koffeman, (Annotation of Schalk and Kopf), EHRC 2010/92, point 10. 
59  ECtHR, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (Application No. 30141/04), judgment of 
24.6.2010. 
60  With respect to derogations, see also Art. 15 (1) ECHR. 
61  See e.g. C. Tobler, Rechtvaardiging van direct onderscheid in het EG-Recht. Het geslo-
ten stelsel van discriminatiegronden in breder perspectief: discussie vervolgd, 2001, 121. 
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2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC). – Again, this issue will be further discussed 
below in the specific context of discrimination against LGBTI people.62 
 
 
IV. Illustration: Discrimination against LGBTI People 
 
1. Introductory Remarks 
 
Against the background outlined above, the present contribution will 
now turn to concrete examples in order to illustrate both the differences 
between the ECHR and EU law and the potential room for standard-
setting within the framework of the existing legal framework, focusing on 
discrimination against LGBTI (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual and In-
tersexual) people. There are different reasons for this choice. First, LGBTI 
people are particularly vulnerable as compared to other groups in our socie-
ties (and within the LGBTI group, intersex and transgender people are even 
more so than gay, lesbian and bisexual people).63 In fact, legal recognition of 
discrimination against LGBTI people is relatively recent, which leaves room 
for development. As is evidenced by recent political developments also in 
Europe,64 this is an area that needs much work (though, on the positive side, 
it has become topical in business, albeit mostly only in the form of LGBT, 
leaving out the I).65 Second, in this area there are some interesting differ-
ences in the approach under the ECHR as compared to EU law. Finally, it 
should be remembered that at the root of discrimination against LGBTI 
people are often stereotypes concerning the sexes, meaning that there is also 
                                                        
62  See IV. below. 
63  For the general situation of LGBTI people in Europe, see the Rainbow Europe Map 
and Index of May 2012 presented by the International Lesbian and Gay, Bisexual, Trans & 
Intersex Association (ILGA), available at <http://www.ilga-europe.org>; and the FRA’s EU 
LGBT survey of May 2013, available via <fra.europa.eu> (unfortunately, this document omits 
the situation of intersex persons). With respect to the particular vulnerability of intersex and 
trans people, see e.g. S. Agius/C. Tobler, Trans and Intersex People. Discrimination on the 
Grounds of Sex, Gender Identity and Gender Expression (for the European Commission), 
2012, 11 et seq.; <http://www.migpolgroup.com>. 
64  Compare e.g. P. Johnson, “Homosexual Propaganda” Laws in the Russian Federation: 
Are They in Violation of the European Convention on Human Rights?, Working paper 
8.7.2013, available via <http://papers.ssrn.com>. 
65  For example, IBM has received various awards for its work in the field of Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual and Transgender Diversity (<http://www-03.ibm.com>). See also e.g. the possibility 
offered by the bank Credit Suisse to buy into a portfolio of large companies with LGBT-
friendly corporate policies (reported by the Financial Times, 21.10.2013), and the campaign of 
Apple Corporate Executive Officer Tim Cook for LGBT Workplace Rights (<http://www. 
macobserver.com>). 
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a link to sex discrimination, which remains one of the most fundamental 
problems of our present-day societies.66 
It should be noted that the legal reach of the following discussion is lim-
ited. In the context of EU law, it is based on the Union’s specific non-
discrimination law, to the exclusion of other areas of law where discrimina-
tion merely plays an indirect role (such as asylum, at issue in the important 
recent case of X., Y. and Z.),67 the free movement of same-sex couples be-
tween EU Member States (much debated in academic writing)68 or the law 
on the Structural Funds. In the context of the CoE, the focus is on Art. 14 
ECHR, to the exclusion of e.g. the reference to sexual orientation in the 
Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and 
Sexual Abuse of 2007 or the reference to both sexual orientation and gender 
identity in the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence of 2011. 
The discussion will begin with intersexuality (i.e. the I in LGBTI) and 
then continue to transgenderism (i.e. the T in LGBTI), both of these being 
aspects of gender identity. It then turns to sexual orientation (i.e. the LGB 
in LGBTI). Depending on the level of legal development of a given issue, 
the discussion will cover more or fewer issues. For example, it will be seen 
that with respect to intersexuality the main question in the present state of 
the law is whether it is recognised as a ground that potentially leads to dis-
crimination. In contrast, this is firmly established with respect to sexual ori-
entation, where there is therefore also case-law on other issues, for example 
on the scope of the law, the existence of discrimination and justification. 
Transsexuality is situated in between these two, at least under EU law, 
where it is recognised as a discrimination ground only to a certain extent 
                                                        
66  See in this context e.g. P. Johnson, Heteronormativity and the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, Law Critique 2012, 43, further also U. Sacksofsky, Grundrechtlicher Schutz für 
Transsexuelle in Deutschland und Europa, in: C. Hohmann-Dennhardt/P. Masuch/M. Villiger 
(note 26), 675 (676 et seq.). 
67  CJEU, Joined Cases C-199/12 to C-201/12 Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v. X. and 
Y. and Z. v. Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel, judgment of 7.11.2013, n.y.r. 
68  See in particular J. Rijpma/N. Koffeman, Free Movement Rights for Same-Sex Couples 
Under EU Law: What Role to Play for the CJEU?, in: D. Galle/L. Paladini/P. Pustorino 
(eds.), Same-Sex Couples before National, Supranational and International Jurisdictions, 
2014, 455, with further references, and C. Karakosta, Portability of Same-sex Marriages and 
Registered Partnerships within the EU, Cyprus Human Rights Law Review 2 (2013), 53. See 
also M. Župan, Registered Partnership in Cross-border Situations – Where Invisibility to Law 
Lies?, in: N. Bodigora-Vukubrat/G. Sander/S. Barić (eds.), Invisible Minorities in Law, 2013, 
95. There is no CJEU case-law yet on the matter. There is, however, some national case-law, 
see e.g. M. Fichera/H. Hartnell, All You Need Is Law: Italian Courts Break New Ground in 
the Treatment of Same-sex Marriage, Helsinki Legal Studies Research Paper No. 22, 2012, 
available through <http://papers.ssrn.com>. 
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and where one particularly problematic issue is that of the approach to 
comparability. 
 
 
2. I – Discrimination against Intersex People: The Missing 
Ground 
 
“Intersex” refers to those people who have genetic, hormonal and physi-
cal features that are neither exclusively male nor exclusively female, but are 
typical of both at once or not clearly defined as either. These features can 
manifest themselves within secondary sexual characteristics such as muscle 
mass, hair distribution, breasts and stature; primary sexual characteristics 
such as reproductive organs and genitalia; and/or in chromosomal struc-
tures and hormones. The term “intersex” has replaced the term “hermaph-
rodite”, which was used extensively by medical practitioners during the 18th 
and 19th centuries.69 
At the basis of the legal issues arising under the ECHR and EU law with 
respect to discrimination against intersex people lies the fact that intersexu-
ality is not mentioned explicitly in the law and there is to date no case-law 
focusing squarely on discrimination against intersex people either under the 
ECHR or under EU law.70 Also in other jurisdictions, intersex cases are ra-
re, and even more so are cases concerning legally recognised discrimination 
on grounds of intersexuality. 
In Germany, two national cases on issues other than discrimination 
(namely on alternative sex classification on civil status documents and on 
bodily integrity, respectively)71 and an expert report have contributed to a 
recent change in the law on birth registers allowing for the registration of 
“indeterminate” sex. This makes Germany the first European country to 
provide for this possibility; countries on other continents did so before.72 
With respect to discrimination, it may be illustrative to consider the deci-
sion by the High Court of Kenya, handed down in 2010, in the case R.M. v. 
Attorney General & 4 others.73 The case concerned an intersex person who 
                                                        
69  S. Agius/C. Tobler (note 63), 89. 
70 There are fleeting references to intersexuality in a number of judgments, e.g. in ECtHR, 
Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom (Application No. 28957/95), judgment of 11.7.2002, 
para. 82. 
71  See again S. Agius/C. Tobler (note 63), 83 et seq.; on the first of these cases, also D. 
Schiek/L. Waddington/M. Bell (note 52), 78. 
72  Germany allows “indeterminate” gender at birth, <http://www.bbc.co.uk>. 
73  R.M. v Attorney General & 4 others [2010] eKLR, see <http://kenyalaw.org>, also 
<http://www.interights.org>. 
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was raised as a male. When criminally convicted and sentenced to death, 
RM was put in prison among the general male death row population, where 
he was treated badly. In court, RM complained, among other things, about 
inhuman and degrading treatment at the hands of prison officials and about 
discrimination under section 82 of the Kenyan Constitution,74 because the 
Constitution and the State failed to recognise or provide prison facilities for 
intersex people and because under Kenyan law it was not possible to state 
intersexuality on a birth certificate. 
In the submissions to the High Court, references were made to case-law 
in Kenya and elsewhere. In the Kenyan context, the court was urged to fol-
low Kenyan Judge Ringera, who stated that the Kenyan Constitution is a 
“living instrument with a soul and a consciousness [which] embodies certain 
values and principles, and must be construed broadly, liberally and purpose-
ly to give effect to those values and principles” (R.M., para. 37). In the in-
ternational context, among others the UN decision in the case Edward 
Young v. Australia75 was cited for the proposition that the term “other sta-
tus” was sufficiently open-ended to include intersex people. The court was 
also encouraged “to display the kind of judicial activism displayed by the 
Constitutional Court of Columbia” in finding that intersex people consti-
tute a minority entitled to protection against discrimination by the state 
(R.M., para. 54). Counsel for the applicant quoted from the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia, which in two decisions76 had stated: 
 
“Intersex people question our capacity for tolerance and constitute a challenge 
to the acceptance of difference. Public authorities, the medical community and 
the citizenry at large have the duty to open up a space for these people who have 
until now been silenced. [...] We all have to listen to them, and not only to learn 
how to live with them, but also to learn from them.” 
 
                                                        
74  Under section 82(1) and (2) of the Kenyan Constitution, no law shall make any provi-
sion that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect and no person shall be treated in a 
discriminatory manner by a person acting by virtue of any written law or in the performance 
of the functions of a public office or a public authority. Under Art. 82(3), the expression “dis-
criminatory” means affording different treatment to different persons attributable wholly or 
mainly to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, place of origin or residence or other 
local connexion, political opinions, colour, creed or sex whereby persons of one such descrip-
tion are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another such description 
are not made subject or are accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to per-
sons of another such description. 
75  UN CCPR, Edward Young v. Australia, Communications No. 941/2000 of 6.8.2003, 
CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (2003). 
76  Constitutional Court of Colombia, Sentensia No. 54-337/99 (The Ramos Case) and 
Sentensia T551/99 (The Cruz Case). 
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To some extent at least, the outcome of the case was favourable for RM in 
that the court granted RM’s claim for damages for inhuman and degrading 
treatment at the hands of prison officials. In that regard, the judgment con-
trasts favourably with the case-law of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, since these so far have never upheld a complaint relating to sexual 
orientation (thus Johnson).77 At the same time, the Kenyan High Court re-
jected all other claims in the R.M. case. With regard to discrimination, the 
court found that RM having been placed in the general male death row 
population was not a violation of his rights, as there had been an order that 
RM was to be accorded exclusive or separate accommodation from the gen-
eral prison populace. In this respect, the judgment appears to disregard the 
fact that in spite of these instructions RM did indeed suffer maltreatment 
because of being an intersex person. 
Turning to European law, it is interesting to note that in reaching its con-
clusions, the Kenyan High Court referred, among others, to case-law from 
the “European Court of Justice” (by which it actually meant the European 
Court of Human Rights) on transgender issues.78 Given the lack of relevant 
case-law, the court could not refer to any judgment specifically on discrimi-
nation against intersex people. In the event that an intersex case should 
eventually reach the ECtHR, there should be no difficulty in recognising 
the relevance of such discrimination in the framework of the ECHR with its 
open list of discrimination grounds. 
In contrast, including discrimination against intersex people in the pre-
sent legal system of the EU might prove more difficult. With respect to the 
open list of grounds in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, it should be 
recalled that the Charter is applicable only where a matter falls within the 
scope of EU law. That is precisely not the case in many fields which are par-
ticularly problematic for intersex people, such as their medicalisation and 
pathologisation (and more specifically the practice of gender surgery on in-
fants in order to make them appear more clearly male or female), but also 
their treatment with respect to e.g. sports activities in schools, marriage and 
military service. 
As for the specific non-discrimination legislation of the EU, it will be re-
called that it is based on a closed system of discrimination grounds that does 
not mention intersexuality as such a ground. This raises the question of 
                                                        
77  P. Johnson, Homosexuality and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
What Can Be Learned from the History of the European Convention on Human Rights?, J. 
L. & Soc. 40 (2013), 249. 
78  See IV. 3. below. 
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whether intersexuality can, and perhaps even should, be seen as part of an-
other, already recognised discrimination ground.79 In this respect, Schiek, 
Waddington & Bell80 have convincingly argued that since there is a close 
relation between intersexuality and gender or sex, it would not be illogical 
to classify distinctions based on intersexuality as being gender-based. 
Among others, the authors point to the CJEU’s statement in P. v. S.,81 ac-
cording to which the scope of the EU’s sex equality law goes beyond “the 
fact that a person is of one or other sex” (P. v. S., para. 20). It is submitted 
that an understanding of the term “sex” along the lines of the statement 
made by Advocate General Tesauro in the P. v. S. case, namely that (biologi-
cal) sex should not be seen as a dichotomy (i.e. male – female) but rather as a 
continuum (para. 17 of the AG’s opinion), would be even more helpful. In 
this manner, the entire body of EU sex equality law would also apply to 
intersex people. Given its limitations in scope, this would still not be 
enough to address the plight of intersex people in an encompassing manner, 
but it would clearly be better than nothing. Further, conceiving of intersex-
uality as an aspect of sex would also allow for additional, specific legislative 
action on such matters based on the competence provisions that exist for 
combating sex discrimination, i.e. Arts. 19(1) and 157(3) TFEU. 
Overall, it may be concluded that at present and with respect to LGBTI 
issues, intersex is the missing discrimination ground in both the ECHR and 
EU law. Given the absence of specific law and of relevant case-law, there is 
ample room for informal standard-setting in order to help to improve the 
situation of this particularly vulnerable group of people in our societies. 
However, whilst the Council of Europe’s Committee on Equality and Non-
Discrimination and its special Rapporteur for LGBT rights deal with ques-
tions of equality and non-discrimination on grounds such as gender identity 
or other status (in particular General Rapporteur Haugli’s Report “Tackling 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity” of 
7.6.2013),82 and whilst the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Eu-
rope (PACE) and the Committee of Ministers (CM) have adopted a resolu-
tion and several recommendations on, among others, gender identity 
(namely PACE Resolution 1728 (2010)83 and Recommendations 1915 
                                                        
79  S. Agius/C. Tobler (note 63), 82. 
80  D. Schiek/L. Waddington/M. Bell (note 52), 79. See also S. Agius/C. Tobler (note 63), 
82. 
81  CJEU, Case C-13/94 P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143. 
82  CoE, H. Haugli, Tackling Discrimination on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity, see <http://assembly.coe.int>. 
83  CoE, Resolution 1728 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly, “Discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity” of 29.4.2010, see <http://assembly.coe.int>. 
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(2010)84 and 2021 (2013);85 CM Recommendation (2010)5),86 so far there 
appears to be no particular focus in their work on intersex people. The same 
is true of the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA)87 and for the (other-
wise very useful) Handbook on European Non-discrimination Law pub-
lished by the FRA together with ECtHR.88 Two positive examples of EU 
soft law documents where intersex people are explicitly included are the 
report “Trans and intersex people. Discrimination on the grounds of sex, 
gender identity and gender expression” commissioned by the European 
Commission and published in 201289 (which led to a seminar organised by 
the European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights on “Trans and in-
tersex people. Challenges for EU law”)90 and the Council of Ministers’ 
“Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons”, adopted 
at the Foreign Affairs meeting of 24.6.2013.91 However, this latter document 
concerns the EU’s external action only. In addition, it has been argued that 
this external rhetoric is not consistent with internal practice (e.g. Mos).92 
 
 
                                                        
84  CoE, Resolution 1915 (2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly, “Discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity” of 29.4.2010, see <http://www.assembly.coe. 
int>. 
85  CoE, Recommendation 2012 (2013), “Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
and gender identity” of 27.6.2013, see <http://assembly.coe.int>. 
86  CoE, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
states on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity of 31.3.2010, see <https://wcd.coe.int>. 
87  See e.g. the following documents, where discrimination against intersex people is not 
mentioned: EU, Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), Homophobia, transphobia and discrim-
ination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in the EU Member States. Sum-
mary of findings, trends, challenges and promising practices, 2011 (available at <http://fra. 
europa.eu>), and Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), Opinion 1/2013 of the European Un-
ion Agency for Fundamental Rights on the situation of equality in the European Union 10 
years on from initial implementation of the equality directives (available at 
<http://fra.europa.eu>). 
88  FRA/ECtHR, Handbook on European Non-discrimination Law, 2011, available online 
at <http://www.echr.coe.int>. 
89  S. Agius/C. Tobler (note 63). This document also attracted press reports, see e.g. “Inter-
sex People in EU: Ashamed and Invisible”, euobserver of 12.6.2012 (available at <http:// 
euobserver.com>). 
90  See <http://www.lgbt-ep.eu>. 
91  Council of the European Union, Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of 
all human rights by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons, <http:// 
www.consilium.europa.eu>. 
92  M. Mos, Conflicted Normative Power Europe: The European Union and Sexual Mi-
nority Rights, Journal of Contemporary European Research 9 (2013), 78. 
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3. T – Discrimination against Transgender People: Problems of 
Comparison and of the Scope of the Law 
 
“Transgender” (or “trans”) is an inclusive umbrella term referring to 
those people whose gender identity and/or gender expression differs from 
the sex they were assigned at birth. It includes, but is not limited to: men 
and women with transsexual pasts, and people who identify as transsexual, 
transgender, transvestite/cross-dressing, androgyne, polygender, gender-
queer, agender, gender variant or any other gender identity and/or expres-
sion which is not standard male or female and express their gender through 
their choice of clothes, presentation or body modifications, including un-
dergoing multiple surgical procedures.93 
In the USA, the Senate has recently voted in favour of a bill banning 
workplace discrimination against gay and transgender people.94 In Europe, 
transgender is not mentioned as a particular discrimination ground either in 
the ECHR or in EU law. There is, however, some case-law on this issue. It 
illustrates the difficulties that can arise with respect to the comparison that 
lies at the basis of a discrimination analysis and also with respect to the lim-
ited scope of the law. 
Cases concerning transgender people first came to the ECtHR in the 
1980s. The struggle of how to deal with them under the Convention is reca-
pitulated in the Goodwin judgment (para. 73). To this day, most transgender 
cases do not involve Art. 14 ECHR.95 A first recognition of a prohibition of 
discrimination against transsexual persons under the Convention came with 
the Court’s judgment in the case P.V. v. Spain96 in 2010. The applicant in this 
case was a male-to-female transsexual who had had a son prior to her gen-
der reassignment and who faced restrictions in her right to visit the child. In 
its judgment, the ECtHR recalled the open list of Art. 14 ECHR with its 
merely indicative character and stated that transsexuality is without any 
                                                        
93  S. Agius/C. Tobler (note 63), glossary, 89. 
94  See e.g. US Senate passes “Enda” gay rights bill. A bill banning workplace discrimina-
tion against gay and transgender people has passed the US Senate with significant cross-party 
support, BBC News, 7.11.2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk>. 
95  See generally on the ECtHR’s case-law C. Cojocariu, Moving Beyond Goodwin: A 
Fresh Assessment of the European Court of Human Rights’ Transgender Rights Jurispru-
dence, INTERIGHTS Bulletin Vol. 17 No. 3: Lawyering on the Margins 2013, 118. Specifi-
cally with respect to health care, see S. Whittle/L. Turner/R. Combs/S. Rhodes, Transgender 
EuroStudy: Legal Survey and Focus on the Transgender Experience of Health Care, 2008; 
further e.g. N. Koffeman, “Regel is regel” is niet genoeg. De toetsing van “bright line rules” 
door het EHRM, NJCM-Bulletin 2009, 623. 
96  ECtHR, P.V. v. Spain (Application No. 35159/09), judgment of 30.11.2010. 
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doubt a notion that is covered by Art. 14 ECHR (P.V., para. 30). It may 
therefore be concluded that, under the ECHR, transsexuality is a discrimi-
nation ground in its own right, i.e. a “stand alone ground”. As a conse-
quence, transgender persons are able to benefit from the prohibition of dis-
crimination under the entire, broad ambit of the Convention. However, 
there appears to be no transgender case where the Court did find a violation 
of the prohibition of discrimination under Art. 14 ECHR.97 Future case-
law will show whether this will change.98 
The situation is different under EU law, where preliminary rulings of the 
CJEU point to a finding of discrimination.99 According to this case-law, 
under certain, narrow circumstances discrimination against trans people 
may amount to discrimination on the grounds of sex.100 The case-law on 
this matter concerns cases where gender reassignment had led to disadvan-
tageous treatment in employment. From a legal point of view, the challenge 
in these cases lies in the comparison made by the Court in order to analyse 
whether there had been different treatment on grounds of sex. In the previ-
ously mentioned case of P. v. S., the Court stated that the dismissal of a 
male-to-female transsexual was due to sex given that the applicant would 
not have been dismissed had she remained a man, i.e. the Court in effect 
compared a man and a woman in the same person. In the subsequent case of 
K.B.,101 the Court compared heterosexual couples of whom one partner is a 
worker (rather than individual workers) and where neither partner’s identi-
ty is the result of gender reassignment surgery on the one hand with couples 
where the identity of one partner is the result of gender reassignment sur-
gery on the other hand. Finally, in Richards102 the Court compared the 
                                                        
 97  Though there are cases where it found violations of other rights; e.g. ECtHR, Van 
Kück v. Germany (Application No. 35968/97), judgment of 12.6.2003, with respect to Art. 8 
ECHR (right to private life). 
 98  See e.g. the pending ECtHR Grand Chamber case Hämäläinen v. Finland (Application 
No. 37359/09), pending, concerning the recognition of the applicant’s gender change. This is a 
referral of H. v Finland (Application No. 37359/09), judgment of 13.11.2012, where the Court 
had found no violation of Art. 14 ECHR. 
 99  In the preliminary ruling procedure under Art. 267 TFEU and with respect to ques-
tions of interpretation, the CJEU is called upon to interpret the EU law that is relevant to a 
concrete case pending before the referring national court, rather than to apply it to the case at 
hand. 
100  See generally e.g. G. N. Toggenburg, “LGBT” Go Luxembourg: On the Stance of 
Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender Rights before the European Court of Justice, Europe-
an Law Reporter 2005, 173 (175 et seq.). 
101  CJEU, Case C-117/01 K.B. v. National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary 
of State for Health [2004] ECR I-541. 
102  CJEU, Case C-423/04 Sarah Margaret Richards v. Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2006] ECR I-3585. 
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treatment of a post-gender-reassignment male-to-female transsexual with 
that of women who did not undergo gender reassignment, i.e. the compari-
son was made within the group of women. 
All three cases reflect the Court’s wish to respect the post-gender-
reassignment transsexual’s wish to belong to the relevant sex. Laudable as 
this is, the comparison now used by the CJEU makes it difficult to see why 
such cases should be seen as sex discrimination cases. Moreover, so far the 
Court’s case-law concerns gender reassignment only. Again, it could be ar-
gued that a broad understanding of the term “sex” as a concept going be-
yond the notion that a person is of one or other sex might be helpful in or-
der to go beyond the present case-law. Again, this would have the advantage 
of making the adoption of secondary law based on Arts. 19(1) and 157(3) 
TFEU possible. Indeed, in the preamble to Directive 2006/54/EC103 it is 
stated explicitly that in view of its purpose and the nature of the rights that 
it seeks to safeguard, the principle of equal treatment of men and women 
also applies to discrimination arising from the gender reassignment of a per-
son. 
However, from a conceptual point of view it would be preferable to rec-
ognise discrimination against transsexual persons as specific discrimination 
ground in its own right, under the name of “gender identity”, as is done un-
der the ECHR. The drawback under EU law is that this would require a 
treaty change, which is a formidable challenge. In addition, even in such a 
case EU law could then only apply within its limited scope and some par-
ticularly burning issues (including, again, in particular the medicalisation of 
trans people)104 would not be covered. In this respect, the ECHR with its 
much more comprehensive ambit offers more, though there has been no 
single case where discrimination was actually found under Art. 14 ECHR, 
and there is so far no statement that justification for discrimination on 
grounds of transsexuality requires very weighty reasons. 
It must be concluded that much remains to be done in both legal systems. 
Though to a lesser degree than in the case of discrimination on grounds of 
intersexuality, this leaves room for informal standard-setting. As noted 
above,105 there are indeed a number of helpful documents addressing, 
among other things, discrimination on grounds of transsexuality both in the 
Council of Europe and in the European Union. 
                                                        
103  Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5.7.2006 on 
the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and 
women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), OJ 2006 L 204/23. 
104  S. Agius/C. Tobler (note 63), 15. 
105  See IV. 2. above. 
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4. LGB – Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation: 
Forms of Discrimination and Justification in Particular 
 
“Sexual orientation” refers to each person’s capacity for profound emo-
tional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations 
with, individuals of a different gender or the same gender or more than one 
gender. It can be heterosexual, homosexual – i.e. lesbian or gay – and bisex-
ual.106 
Compared to intersexuality and transsexuality, discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation is far more developed in legal terms under the 
ECHR and EU law.107 In the following, different elements of the discrimi-
nation analysis are addressed, though with a particular emphasis on the dif-
ferent forms of discrimination and on justification. 
 
 
a) Recognising the Discrimination Ground of Sexual Orientation 
 
In the ECHR, the open-ended list of discrimination grounds under Art. 
14 ECHR does not mention sexual orientation. However, the issue was rec-
ognised by the ECtHR much earlier than under EU law, at least in princi-
ple, in the above-mentioned case of Dudgeon v. The UK. Here, the Court 
found a ban on same-sex activity under national law to be in violation of the 
right to private life under Art. 8 ECHR. With respect to Art. 14 ECHR, the 
Court reiterated that a simultaneous breach of a substantive article and of 
Art. 14 ECHR is possible, though only where a clear inequality of treat-
ment in the enjoyment of the right in question is a fundamental aspect of 
the case. In the case at hand, the Court found this not to be the case. 
Subsequently, a certain degree of confusion arose with respect to the rele-
vant discrimination ground under the ECHR. In its report on Sutherland v. 
The UK,108 the then European Commission of Human Rights noted that it 
was not clear whether a difference based on sexual orientation is a difference 
                                                        
106  Yogyakarta Principles (<http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org>). See also C. Waaldijk, 
The Right to Relate: On the Importance of “Orientation” in Comparative Sexual Orientation 
Law, inaugural lecture at Leiden University 2008, available through <https://openaccess. 
leidenuniv.nl>. 
107  For a critical account with respect to the ECtHR, see P. Johnson, Homosexuality and 
the Court of Human Rights, 2013; also P. Johnson, “An Essentially Private Manifestation of 
Human Personality”: Constructions of Homosexuality in the European Court of Human 
Rights, HRLR 10 (2010), 67. 
108  ECtHR Commission report, Sutherland v. The UK (Application No. 25186/94), re-
port of 1.7.1997. 
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based on “sex” or on “other status” for the purposes of Art. 14 ECHR. The 
reason for this was the fact that the Human Rights Committee set up under 
the United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(CCPR) had considered that sexual orientation was to be included in the 
concept of “sex” within the meaning of Art. 26 CCPR. In the Sutherland 
case, and for the purposes of Art. 14 ECHR, the European Commission of 
Human Rights considered it unnecessary to decide on the matter, arguing 
that in either event there was a difference in respect of which the Commis-
sion was entitled to seek justification. The matter was clarified in 1999 in 
Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal,109 concerning the refusal of child cus-
tody to a gay man because of his homosexuality. Here, the ECtHR stated 
that a difference based on a person’s sexual orientation is “a concept which 
is undoubtedly covered by Article 14 of the Convention”, adding that “the 
list set out in that provision is illustrative and not exhaustive, as is shown by 
the words “any ground such as” (in French “notamment”)” (Salgueiro da 
Silva Mouta, para. 28). From this, it may be concluded that the Court rec-
ognises sexual orientation as a discrimination ground in its own right, rather 
than conceiving of it as being part of either “sex” or “other status”.110 
In EU law, sexual orientation has been an explicitly recognised discrimi-
nation ground since the Amsterdam revision, which introduced Art. 13 into 
the EC Treaty (now Art. 19 TFEU), which gave the EC the explicit compe-
tence to adopt legislation combating discrimination on grounds of, among 
others, sexual orientation. Subsequently, this led to the adoption of Di-
rective 2000/78/EC.111 When arguments concerning discrimination against 
homosexual people were first made before the CJEU in the Grant case112 in 
the late 1990s, the applicant relied on the equal pay principle for men and 
women under what were at the relevant time Art. 119 of the EEC Treaty 
(today Art. 157(1) and (2) TFEU) and Directive 75/117/EEC113 (since then 
incorporated into Directive 2006/54/EC). At that time, no other avenue was 
open given that Directive 2000/78/EC was not yet in force at the material 
                                                        
109  ECtHR, Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal (Application No. 33290/96), judgment 
of 21.12.1999. 
110  See e.g. A.-M. Mooney Cotter, Ask No Questions: An International Legal Analysis on 
Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 2010, 266. 
111  See generally K. Waaldijk/M. Bonini-Baraldi, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in 
the European Union: National Laws and the Employment Equality Directive, 2006. 
112  CJEU, Case C-249/96 Lisa Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd. [1998] ECR I-621. 
113  Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10.2.1975 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women, 
OJ 1975 L 45/19. 
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time and given also that Community law was based on a closed system of 
discrimination grounds. 
The question in the Grant case was whether an employer’s refusal to 
grant travel concessions to the person of the same sex with whom an em-
ployee has a stable relationship constitutes sex discrimination prohibited by 
Community law, where such concessions are granted to an employee’s 
spouse or the person of the opposite sex with whom an employee has a sta-
ble relationship outside marriage. Ms Grant, who had a female partner, ar-
gued that her employer’s decision would have been different if the benefits 
in issue in the main proceedings had been claimed by a man living with a 
woman, and not by a woman living with a woman. Accordingly, there was 
sex discrimination. Relying on P. v. S. concerning transsexuality,114 she also 
argued that discrimination based on sexual orientation must be included in 
the concept of “discrimination based on sex” under the Treaty, since differ-
ences in treatment based on sexual orientation originate in prejudices re-
garding the sexual and emotional behaviour of people of a particular sex, 
and are in fact based on those people’ sex. 
However, the CJEU refused to accept this reasoning (for which it was 
subsequently much criticised by commentators).115 As regards the already 
mentioned approach under the CCPR, on which Ms Grant tried to rely, the 
Court noted that the Human Rights Committee is not a judicial institution, 
that its findings have no binding force in law and that it did not give any 
specific reasons for finding that “sex” must be understood as including sex-
ual orientation. The Court also noted that whilst the CCPR is an interna-
tional instrument relating to the protection of human rights of which the 
Court takes account in applying the fundamental principles of Community 
(now: Union) law, it cannot in itself have the effect of extending the scope 
of the Treaty provisions beyond the competences of the Community. Ra-
ther, these were broadened only through the Amsterdam revision, by in-
cluding Art. 13 EC, as already mentioned. Since then, a number of cases 
have reached the CJEU on matters involving alleged discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation – though so far these have only been cases 
concerning homosexuality, to the exclusion of bisexuality.116 
 
 
                                                        
114  See IV. 2. above. 
115  See e.g. M. Bell, Shifting Conceptions of Sexual Discrimination at the Court of Justice: 
from P v S to Grant v SWT, ELJ 1999, 63. 
116  Compare generally K. Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, in: M. 
Albertson Fineman/J. E. Jackson/A. P. Romero (eds.), Feminist and Queer Legal Theory: 
Intimate Encounters, Uncomfortable Conversations, 2009, 201. 
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b) The Scope of the Prohibition 
 
A further, very obvious difference between the ECHR and EU law with 
respect to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orienta-
tion concerns the scope of this prohibition. As stated above, Art. 14 ECHR 
can apply within the entire, broad ambit of the Convention, and for those 
states that have ratified Protocol 12 even to issues beyond that scope.117 Ac-
cordingly, the sexual orientation case-law of the ECtHR under Art. 14 
ECHR deals with issues as different as the age of consent under criminal 
law for sexual relations (e.g. the above-mentioned case of E.B. and Others v. 
Austria, which is a follow-up on a number of previous cases concerning 
Austria), succession of a deceased partner’s tenancy inheritance (e.g. Kozak 
v. Poland),118 child custody (Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal), adop-
tion (e.g. X and Others v. Austria),119 social security (P.B. and J.S. v. Aus-
tria),120 public manifestations (Genderdoc-M v. Moldavia),121 conditions of 
detention in prison (X v. Turkey)122 and marital status or another form of 
legal recognition (e.g. the recent case of Vallianatos and Others v. 
Greece).123 
Conversely, Directive 2000/78/EC only covers employment and occupa-
tion, even to the exclusion of employment-related social security and of 
other matters covered by other instruments of EU law dealing with other 
types of discrimination, such as access to services or social advantages. 
Against this background, the case-law of the CJEU concerning discrimina-
tion on grounds of sexual orientation deals exclusively with matters of em-
ployment and occupation, though it must be added that based on a broad 
interpretation of the concept of pay, this also includes entitlements to occu-
                                                        
117  See generally e.g. F. Crisafulli, Same-Sex Couples’ Rights (Other than the Right to 
Marry) Before the ECtHR, in: D. Galle/L. Paladini/P. Pustorino (note 68), 409. Regarding the 
right to marry; and in the same volume, P. Pustorino, Same-Sex Couples Before the ECtHR: 
The Right to Marriage, 399. 
118  ECtHR, Kozak v. Poland (Application No. 13102/02), judgment of 2.3.2010. 
119  ECtHR, X and Others v. Austria (Application No. 19010/07), judgment of 19.2.2013. 
120  ECtHR, P.B. and J.S. v. Austria (Application No. 18984/02), judgment of 22.7.2010. 
121  ECtHR, Genderdoc-M v. Moldavia (Application No. 9106/06), judgment of 12.6.2012. 
122  ECtHR, X v. Turkey (Application No. 24626/09), judgment of 9.10.2012. 
123  ECtHR, Vallianatos and Others v. Greece (Application Nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09), 
judgment of 7.11.2013. Generally on the recognition of civil unions, see K. Boele-Woelki/A. 
Fuchs (eds.), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe. National, Cross-border 
and European Perspectives, fully revised 2nd ed. 2012; further e.g. S. L. Cooper, Marriage, 
Family, Discrimination & Contradiction: An Evaluation of the Legacy and Future of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence on LGBT Rights, GLJ 12 (2011), 1746. See 
also more generally M. Y. K. Lee, Equality, Dignity and Same-Sex Marriage. A Rights Disa-
greement in Democratic Societies, 2010. 
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pational pension benefits. Similarly, in the context of employment matters, 
the Court was able to consider married status, even though this is not as 
such a field where the EU enjoys competences. These aspects are evidenced 
in Maruko, Römer124 and Hay.125 
In Maruko, the surviving partner of a registered same-sex couple in Ger-
many was refused a widower’s pension by the deceased partner’s employer 
on the ground that the Pension Regulations granted a pension only to the 
opposite-sex spouse of the insured person. Similarly, the Römer case con-
cerned the method of calculation of an occupational pension scheme in the 
form of a supplementary retirement pension for former employees of a local 
authority and their survivors, which favoured married recipients over those 
living in a registered life partnership, marriage in Germany not being open 
to same-sex partners. In both cases, the CJEU held that whilst Directive 
2000/78/EC excludes from its scope social security and social protection 
schemes, it is stated in its preamble that it does cover benefits that are 
equivalent to “pay” within the meaning given to that term for the applica-
tion of Art. 157 TFEU (on equal pay for men and women), and it found the 
benefits at issue in the two cases to be covered by the notion of pay. 
As for the recent Hay case, it is more straightforward as far as the scope 
of EU law is concerned. The case concerned the refusal by Mr Hay’s em-
ployer to award him days of special leave and a marriage bonus because Mr 
Hay was a partner in a civil solidarity pact (namely the so-called “pacte civil 
de solidarité“, PACS) under French law rather than being married. The re-
fusal was based on a collective agreement that restricts benefits in respect of 
pay and working conditions to employees who marry. The Court recalled 
that the concept of “pay” covers, in particular, any consideration, whether 
in cash or in kind, whether immediate or future, provided that the employee 
receives it, albeit indirectly, in respect of his or her employment from his or 
her employer, and irrespective of whether it is received under a contract of 
employment, by virtue of legislative provisions or on a voluntary basis. Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that Directive 2000/78/EC is applicable to a situa-
tion such as that which gave rise to the main proceedings. 
Similarly straightforward in terms of scope is ACCEPT,126 concerning 
public statements ruling out the recruitment of a footballer presented as be-
ing homosexual and made by the main sponsor of a professional football 
                                                        
124  CJEU, Case C-147/08 Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2011] ECR I-
3591. 
125  CJEU, Case C-267/12 Frédéric Hay v. Crédit agricole mutuel de Charente-Maritime 
et des Deux-Sèvres, judgment of 12.12.2013, n.y.r. 
126  CJEU, Case C-81/12 Asociaţia ACCEPT v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea 
Discriminării, judgment of 25.4.2013, n.y.r. 
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club, who was presenting himself and being perceived by the public as play-
ing a leading role in the club. The challenge of this case lay less in the scope 
of Directive 2000/78/EC than in the question of whether, given the circum-
stances, the sponsor could be seen as acting for the club. The Court found 
this to be the case. 
Positive as these cases may be, given the limited scope of the Directive it 
remains an unfortunate fact that the present EU law on discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation is unable to address the problem of such dis-
crimination in people’s everyday lives in its full breadth. At the same time, 
Directive 2000/78/EC having the character of a mere minimum legislation, 
the Member States are free to adopt more far-reaching national legisla-
tion.127 Nevertheless, a clear signal from the EU on such matters would be 
helpful. As was already stated, whilst the ECHR is broader in scope than 
EU law, it is weaker in terms of enforcement. Accordingly, EU law may be 
more effective in practice. 
 
 
c) The Meaning of Discrimination 
 
Further differences between the ECHR and EU law that can be illustrat-
ed with respect to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation concern the interpretation of the concepts of discrimination and 
justification – differences that exist despite the common starting point of an 
Aristotelian understanding of equality with its focus on comparability. 
 
aa) Comparability 
 
In both legal systems, the issue of comparability presents numerous chal-
lenges. Manenc128 provides an example in the framework of the ECHR. The 
case concerned a pension regulation in France which treated cohabitating 
and married couples differently, allegedly leading to indirect discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation (namely in view of the fact that marriage 
was not open to same-sex couples in France at the relevant time). However, 
the ECtHR held that there is no particular disadvantage to same-sex cou-
ples, since the registered partnership (PACS) is open to both heterosexual 
and homosexual couples in France, and since more of the former have cho-
                                                        
127  Compare in this context A. McColgan, National Protection beyond the two EU Anti-
discrimination Directives. The Grounds of Religion and Belief, Disability, Age and Sexual 
Orientation beyond Employment (for the European Commission), 2013. 
128  ECtHR, Manenc v. France (Application No. 66686/09), decision of 21.9.2010. The ac-
tion was declared inadmissible. 
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sen it. In other words, the Court compared the group of heterosexual cou-
ples who have chosen the PACS with the group of homosexual couples who 
did the same. However, as is noted in the Dutch-language Commentary on 
the ECHR,129 this comparison overlooks the fact that the problem of the 
case resided in the lack of a possibility for homosexuals to opt for marriage 
as an alternative and, thereby, for the more favourable treatment. Seen in 
this way, same-sex couples were indeed more affected than opposite-sex 
couples. As it was, the Court’s approach to the issue of comparability made 
a finding of discrimination impossible.130 
Against this background, the recent judgment in the case of Vallianatos 
and Others v. Greece131 forms a favourable contrast. The case concerned the 
question of whether Greece discriminated against same-sex couples by in-
troducing a civil union for heterosexual couples only. The Greek Govern-
ment argued that the fact that same-sex couples cannot have biological chil-
dren together justified limiting civil unions to different-sex couples. How-
ever, the Court did not consider this difference legally relevant. Instead, re-
ferring to the previous case of Schalk and Kopf, it reiterated that same-sex 
couples are just as capable as different-sex couples of entering into stable, 
committed relationships. Therefore, the Court considered that the appli-
cants were in a comparable situation to different-sex couples as regards their 
need for legal recognition and protection of their relationship. According to 
one commentator, it is somewhat ironic that Schalk and Kopf, which estab-
lished that there is no positive obligation for contracting states to provide 
same-sex couples with partnership recognition, should be used in this 
way.132 
Turning to EU law, in the cases of Maruko and Römer the finding of dis-
crimination depended on the comparability of the registered partnership for 
same-sex couples under German law with marriage. In Maruko, the CJEU 
explained that the comparison to be made must not be global and abstract, 
                                                        
129  J. H. Gerards (note 2), C.1.5.2 Geschiedenis van erkenning van het concept van indi-
rect onderscheid. 
130  Also critical with respect to the Court’s approach to comparability (in a more general 
context) is J. Nozawa, Drawing the Line: Same-sex Adoption and the Jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR on the Application of the “European Consensus” Standard under Article 14. X and 
Others v. Australia, App. No. 19010/07, Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights 
(Grand Chamber) of 19.2.2013, Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 29 
(2013), 66. 
131  ECtHR, Vallianatos and Others v. Greece (Application Nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09), 
judgment of 7.11.2013. 
132  P. Johnson, Vallianatos Judgment on Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Civil Part-
nerships, guest commentary posted on 8.11.2013 on the ECHR Blog by A. Buyse, <http:// 
echrblog.blogspot.co.uk>. 
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but rather specific and concrete in the light of the benefit concerned. On the 
basis of the analysis of German law carried out by the national court re-
questing a preliminary ruling, the Court made it clear that registered life 
partnership is to be treated as equivalent to marriage as regards the widow’s 
or widower’s pension. This was subsequently confirmed in Römer. Compa-
rability in such cases being an issue of the legal and factual context, it must 
be concluded that the relevance of case-law such as Maruko and Römer dif-
fers in different countries of the European Union.133 It also implies that 
there is no protection where it is most needed, namely in national systems 
where homosexual relationships find no legal recognition.134 More funda-
mentally, the Court has been criticised for reinforcing a binary way of 
thinking with respect to relationships, which reinforces the traditional het-
ero-normative ideal of the nuclear family which privileges dependencies and 
gender roles.135 
As noted above, the more recent EU law case of Hay, like the ECHR 
case of Manenc, concerned the French PACS. With respect to the require-
ment of comparability, the CJEU stated that as regards the days of paid 
leave and the bonus which the provisions at issue in the main proceedings 
grant to employees on the occasion of their marriage, it is necessary to ex-
amine whether persons who enter into a marriage and persons who, being 
unable to marry a person of their own sex, enter into a PACS, are in compa-
rable situations. In other words, the Court used a different and, it is submit-
ted, more appropriate comparison than the ECtHR did in Manenc. Indeed, 
the CJEU noted in Hay that although the PACS may also be concluded by 
persons of different sexes, and although there may be general differences 
between the systems governing marriage and the PACS arrangement, the 
latter was, at the time of the facts in the main proceedings, the only possibil-
ity under French law for same-sex couples to procure legal status for their 
relationship which could be certain and effective against third parties. The 
Court found that, like marriage, the PACS constitutes a form of civil union 
under French law which places the couple within a specific legal framework 
entailing rights and obligations in respect of each other and vis-à-vis third 
parties. From this, the Court concluded that as regards benefits in terms of 
pay or working conditions, such as days of special leave and a bonus like 
those at issue in the main proceedings, granted at the time of an employee’s 
                                                        
133  C. Tobler/K. Waaldijk, Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deut-
schen Bühnen, CML Rev. 46 (2009), 723 (743). 
134  G. Toggenburg (note 100), 181. 
135  J. Mulder, Some More Equal than Others? Matrimonial Benefits and the CJEU’s Case-
law on Discrimination on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation, Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp 
Law 2013, 505 (514 et seq.). 
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marriage – which is a form of civil union – persons of the same sex who 
cannot enter into marriage and therefore conclude a PACS are in a situation 
which is comparable to that of couples who marry. The Court found other 
differences to be irrelevant. 
A final remark on comparability concerns the distinction between direct 
and indirect discrimination under EU law. In the legal definitions of these 
concepts in the most modern generation of EU secondary law, comparabil-
ity is explicitly mentioned only with respect to direct discrimination. In-
deed, it has been argued that comparability of situations should not be a re-
quirement with respect to indirect discrimination.136 However, to date there 
is no CJEU case-law to confirm this argument. Previous case-law on indi-
rect sex discrimination did include the requirement of comparability.137 
 
bb) Direct and Indirect Discrimination, and Justification 
 
A comparison of the case-law of the ECtHR and the CJEU on sexual 
orientation is particularly interesting with respect to the distinction between 
direct and indirect discrimination. As already stated, both legal orders rec-
ognise these legal concepts, though EU law is more developed in this re-
spect. In addition, there are important differences in terms of the approach 
to justification. The case-law on discrimination on grounds of sexual orien-
tation may serve as an illustration, even though there has been no finding of 
indirect discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation by the ECtHR or 
the CJEU.138 
The lack of findings of indirect discrimination is not surprising with re-
spect to those cases involving a differentiation explicitly made on the basis 
of homosexuality, as in all the cases so far judged by the ECtHR and in the 
EU law case of ACCEPT (concerning a speech act explicitly related to ho-
mosexuality). It was, however, much more of a surprise in the EU law case 
of Maruko, as subsequently confirmed in Römer and Hay, since these cases 
                                                        
136  E.g. D. Schiek/L. Waddington/M. Bell (note 52), 468; J. Mulder (note 135), 515; also 
Advocate General Jääskinen in his opinion on the Römer case, para. 152. 
137  E.g. CJEU, Case C-220/02 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, Gewerkschaft der 
Privatangestellten v. Wirtschaftskammer Österreich [2004] ECR I-5907. 
138  Note, however, that according to de Schutter the failure to take into account relevant 
differences could be seen as indirect discrimination; O. de Schutter, The Prohibition of Dis-
crimination under European Human Rights Law. Relevance for EU Racial and Employment 
Equality Directives (for the European Commission), 2005, 52. In that sense, the ECtHR’s 
judgment in the case E.B. and Others v. Austria might be seen as an indirect discrimination 
case. However, the ECtHR does not mention indirect discrimination – in the present writer’s 
opinion rightly so, as indirect discrimination in the context of same treatment should be re-
served to cases where the different treatment is only apparently different; compare C. Tobler 
(note 50), 219 et seq. 
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involve a differentiation based on marital status (namely Maruko in relation 
to an occupational pension granted by the former employer of a deceased 
worker to the surviving spouse, who, under the relevant German legislation, 
could only be an opposite-sex person; Römer in relation to the calculation 
of an occupational pension in the form of a supplementary retirement pen-
sion for former employees of a local authority and their survivors, with the 
method of calculation favouring married recipients over those living in a 
registered life partnership; and Hay in relation to benefits that were granted 
upon the employee’s entering the state of marriage). 
In Maruko, it was argued before the CJEU that the pension regulation at 
issue leads to indirect discrimination against homosexual workers, who 
cannot build up an entitlement to a survivor’s pension for their same-sex 
partners even if their partnership is registered under the law. This approach 
was supported by Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer and by the Eu-
ropean Commission. However, the Court, having stated that registered life 
partners are treated less favourably than surviving spouses as regards enti-
tlement to the survivor’s benefit, found that, 
 
“if the referring court decides that surviving spouses and surviving life partners 
are in a comparable situation so far as concerns that survivor’s benefit, legislation 
such as that at issue in the main proceedings must, as a consequence, be consid-
ered to constitute direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, within 
the meaning of Articles 1 and 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78” (Maruko, para. 78). 
 
There are no explanations in the judgment for this approach, an approach 
which in fact means that apparently neutral differentiation criteria whose 
effect is the exclusion of all persons of a protected group must be seen as 
leading to direct discrimination and which, therefore, together with the ear-
lier sex equality case of Nikoloudi,139 draws a new dividing line between 
direct and indirect discrimination under EU law.140 As the Court stated in 
the subsequent case of Hay (para. 44): 
 
“The difference in treatment based on the employees’ marital status and not 
expressly on their sexual orientation is still direct discrimination because only 
persons of different sexes may marry and homosexual employees are therefore 
unable to meet the condition required for obtaining the benefit claimed.” 
 
                                                        
139  CJEU, Case C-196/02 Vasiliki Nikoloudi v. Organismos Tilepikoinonion Ellados AE 
[2005] ECR I-1789. 
140  C. Tobler/K. Waaldijk (note 133), 735 et seq., and C. Tobler, Limits and Potential of 
the Concept of Indirect Discrimination (for the European Commission), 2008, 48 et seq.; see 
also C. Tobler/J. Beglinger (note 27), Chart 10/12. 
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As is noted in the Handbook on European non-discrimination law,141 
this is the same approach as in the Eastleigh case from the UK,142 where the 
then House of Lords of the UK found direct sex discrimination in the con-
text of a differentiation based on different statutory retirement ages for men 
and women. The Handbook seems to imply that this approach should also 
be followed under the ECHR. However, given the ECtHR’s generally more 
hesitant approach to indirect discrimination, it is doubtful that it would do 
so should a comparable case arise before it. 
As for EU law, it has been suggested that an assessment of the Maruko 
case in the light of indirect discrimination would have been more beneficial, 
because it would have enabled the Court to assess the detrimental effect of 
matrimonial benefits on many groups in society.143 However, a finding of 
direct discrimination is more beneficial for the applicant with respect to the 
issue of justification. The Court’s judgment does not mention justification. 
One commentator suggested that the Court opted for a finding of direct 
discrimination in order to exclude the justification argument of fostering 
traditional marriage as previously accepted by German courts on the basis 
of Art. 6(1) of the German Basic Law, i.e. the country’s Federal Constitu-
tion144 (subsequently, this approach was revised).145 
As was already noted,146 under EU law usually only the justification 
grounds explicitly stated in the law can be relied on in the case of direct dis-
crimination. Indeed, in Hay (para. 46), the Court noted that 
 
“as the discrimination is direct, it may be upheld, not on the basis of a ‘legiti-
mate aim’ within the meaning of Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78, as that pro-
vision covers only indirect discrimination, but only on one of the grounds re-
ferred to in Article 2(5) of that directive, namely public security, the maintenance 
of public order and the prevention of criminal offences, the protection of health 
and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. 
 
Other grounds allowing for differential treatment are occupational re-
quirements (Art. 4) and positive action (Art. 7). In Hay (para. 47), the Court 
further reaffirmed the general approach under EU law according to which 
                                                        
141  Handbook on European Non-discrimination Law (note 88), 26. See also C. Tobler/K. 
Waaldijk (note 133), 740. 
142  James v. Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] UK House of Lords, judgment of 6.6.1990. 
143  J. Mulder (note 135), 521. 
144  M. Lembke, Sind an die Ehe geknüpfte Leistungen des Arbeitgebers auch an Lebens-
partner zu gewähren?, NJW 61 (2008), 1631 (1633). 
145  H. Graupner, Comparing People or Institutions? Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
in the Court of Justice of the European Union, in: K. Boele-Woelki/A. Fuchs (note 123), 271 
(278). 
146  See III. 7. above. 
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derogation grounds have to be interpreted restrictively. This means that 
they cannot be interpreted to include other matters such as the protection of 
the traditional family. In contrast, this latter aim might very well fall within 
the notion of objective justification that is part of the definition of the legal 
concept of indirect discrimination. 
In Römer, the national court requesting a preliminary ruling from the 
CJEU specifically raised the question of whether the objective of the pro-
tection of marriage, contained in Art. 6(1) of the German Basic Law, could 
justify direct discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. In this re-
spect, the Court merely observed as a preliminary point that whilst under 
the present EU law legislation on the marital status of persons falls within 
the competence of the Member States, for the field of employment and oc-
cupation, Directive 2000/78/EC aims to combat, among others, discrimina-
tion on the ground of sexual orientation with a view to putting into effect in 
the Member States the principle of equal treatment. Again, this implies that 
the Directive’s distinction between the (in principle) broad justification pos-
sibilities in the case of indirect discrimination and the more narrow statuto-
ry justification for direct discrimination applies. 
Returning to the ECHR, the distinction between direct and indirect dis-
crimination is, in spite of the Convention’s open list of discrimination 
grounds, of practical relevance here due to the different levels of scrutiny 
applied by the ECtHR with respect to justification, i.e. the requirement of 
very weighty reasons or otherwise. Sexual orientation is among those dis-
crimination grounds for which the Court requires “particularly convincing 
and weighty reasons”, meaning that State’s margin of appreciation in this 
field is narrow and that differences based solely on considerations of sexual 
orientation are unacceptable (e.g. Vallianatos and Others v. Greece). The 
concept of indirect discrimination is able to bring cases within the ambit of 
the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, cases 
which otherwise might lead to a less strict approach on the level of justifica-
tion. 
With respect to the protection of the family founded on a union of a man 
and a woman, the ECtHR reiterated in Kozak v. Poland that protection of 
the family in the traditional sense is, in principle, a weighty and legitimate 
reason that might justify a difference in treatment, in particular with a view 
to the interest of any children concerned.147 It added, however, that, given 
                                                        
147  At the same time, it has so far not been accepted by the court that such difference in 
treatment is indeed in the interests of the child; see N. Koffeman, (Annotation of X and Oth-
ers v. Austria), EHRC 2013/104; ECtHR, X and Others v. Austria (Application No. 
19010/07), judgment of 19.2.2013. 
http://www.zaoerv.de
© 2014, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
558 Tobler 
ZaöRV 74 (2014) 
that the Convention is a living instrument to be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions, 
 
“the State, in its choice of means designed to protect the family and secure […] 
respect for family life must necessarily take into account developments in society 
and changes in the perception of social, civil-status and relational issues, includ-
ing the fact that there is not just one way or one choice in the sphere of leading 
and living one’s family or private life” (para. 98). 
 
Recognising that striking a balance between the protection of the tradi-
tional family and the Convention rights of sexual minorities is a difficult 
and delicate exercise which may require the State to reconcile conflicting 
views and interests perceived by the parties concerned as being in funda-
mental opposition, the Court then referred to the State’s narrow margin of 
appreciation in adopting measures that result in a difference based on sexual 
orientation and held that a blanket exclusion of persons living in a homo-
sexual relationship from succession to a tenancy cannot be accepted as nec-
essary for the protection of the family viewed in its traditional sense. The 
Court therefore found that there had been a violation of Art. 14, taken in 
conjunction with Art. 8 ECHR. 
In Vallianatos the protection of the family in the traditional sense was al-
so brought forward by the Greek Government in terms of justification for 
the fact that the Greek legislator introduced the new status of the “civil un-
ion” only for couples of different sex. In this case, the Court referred to a 
trend currently emerging with regard to the introduction of forms of legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships. It pointed out that nine Signatory 
States to the Convention provide for same-sex marriage and seventeen 
States authorise some form of civil partnership for same-sex couples. Ac-
cording to the Court, the trend emerging in the legal systems of the Council 
of Europe States 
 
“is clear: of the nineteen States which authorise some form of registered part-
nership other than marriage, Lithuania and Greece are the only ones to reserve it 
exclusively to different-sex couples. In other words, with two exceptions, Coun-
cil of Europe member States, when they opt to enact legislation introducing a 
new system of registered partnership as an alternative to marriage for unmarried 
couples, include same-sex couples in its scope. Moreover, this trend is reflected in 
the relevant Council of Europe materials. In that regard the Court refers particu-
larly to Resolution 1728(2010) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe and to Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 […]. 
The fact that, at the end of a gradual evolution, a country finds itself in an isolat-
ed position as regards one aspect of its legislation does not necessarily imply that 
that aspect conflicts with the Convention […]. Nevertheless, in view of the fore-
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going, the Court considers that the Government have not offered convincing and 
weighty reasons capable of justifying the exclusion of same-sex couples from the 
scope of [the Greek law in question].” (Vallianatos, paras. 91 and 92) 
 
As Doty148 notes with respect to previous case-law, the ECtHR’s increas-
ingly strict approach with respect to discrimination against homosexuals in 
this field is largely due to its recognition of the nature of the Convention as 
a living instrument. 
 
 
d) Finally: The Role of Soft Law 
 
In the field of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, soft law 
documents appeared earlier than with respect to the legal situation of inter-
sex and trans people. In this context, the European Parliament’s Resolution 
on equal rights of homosexuals and lesbians in the EU of 1994149 and PACE 
Recommendations 1470 (2000)150 and 1474 (2000)151 may be mentioned in 
particular, in addition to more recent documents on sexual orientation, as 
already mentioned (including in particular, on the side of the CoE, the 
Haugli Report “Tackling discrimination on the grounds of sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity” of 2013, PACE Resolution 1728 (2010) and Rec-
ommendations 1915 (2010) and 2021 (2013) as well as CM Recommenda-
tion (2010)5); on the side of the EU notably the FRA report “Homophobia, 
transphobia and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender 
identity in the EU Member States. Summary of findings, trends, challenges 
and promising practices” of 2011 and FRA Opinion 1/2013 on the situation 
of equality in the European Union 10 years on from initial implementation 
of the equality directives; and the Handbook on European non-discrimina-
tion law published jointly by the FRA and the ECtHR), but also including 
more generally the practically extremely useful “How to Present a Discrim-
ination Claim – Handbook on Seeking Remedies under the EU Non-
discrimination Directives” published by the European Commission and 
                                                        
148  K. A. Doty, From Fretté to E.B.: The European Court of Human Rights on Gay and 
Lesbian Adoption, Law and Sexuality Review 8 (2009), 121 (133). 
149  EU, European Parliament Resolution on equal rights for homosexuals and lesbians in 
the EC, OJ 1994 C 61/40. 
150  CoE, Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1470 (2000), “Situation of gays and 
lesbians and their partners in respect of asylum and immigration in the member states of the 
Council of Europe” of 30.6.2000, see <http://assembly.coe.int>. 
151  CoE, Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1474 (2000) on the “Situation of les-
bians and gays in Council of Europe member states” of 26.9.2000, see <http://assembly.coe. 
int>. 
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intended to provide simple and basic guidance to victims of discrimination 
on identifying a discrimination situation, checking whether it is lawful or 
unlawful and then planning (legal) action.152 
The ECtHR’s judgment in the case of Vallianatos shows that even in a le-
gal context that is more developed than the law concerning discrimination 
against intersex or trans persons, soft law documents may be useful in order 
to underpin a Court’s finding of discrimination – though not only here, but 
also in situations where political developments go against the protection of 
a certain group of people from discrimination, as mentioned in the intro-
duction. 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In their articles on gender discrimination, both Besson153 and Burri154 
conclude that very different approaches with respect to discrimination un-
der the ECHR and EU law emerge from the ECtHR’s and the CJEU case-
law, in spite of judicial dialogue and references in particular in the case-law 
of the CJEU to case-law of the ECtHR. They observe that such a situation 
might lead to contradictory solutions to concrete cases, for example with 
respect to the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination and the 
possibility of justification. Haverkort-Speekenbrink,155 while acknowledg-
ing the possibility of conflicts, argues that in practice the end result of ap-
plying the different approaches “may not be so different after all”. There is 
agreement, however, on the fact that the accession of the EU to the ECHR, 
as envisaged by Art. 6(2) TEU,156 may bring about certain changes. More 
specifically, Gerards157 argues that whilst generally the CJEU might have to 
adapt its interpretations and definitions to the well-established and long-
standing human rights case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, in 
the specific field of non-discrimination law it might be the other way round 
                                                        
152  L. Farkas, How to Present a Discrimination Claim – Handbook on Seeking Remedies 
under the EU Non-discrimination Directives (for the European Commission), 2012. 
153  S. Besson (note 5), 676 et seq. 
154  S. D. Burri (note 6), 102 et seq. 
155  S. Haverkort-Speekenbrink (note 7), 329. 
156  On the accession, see e.g. J. P. Jacqué, The Accession of the European Union to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CML Rev. 48 (2011), 
995; and K. Raba, The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – Overview on the Accession Agreement, ERA 
Forum 2013, 557. 
157  J. Gerards (note 42), 102. 
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in order to provide for a high level of protection offered by Art. 14 ECHR 
in line with the sophisticated doctrine in the case-law of the CJEU. Similar-
ly, Besson158 and Haverkort-Speekenbrink159 expect that the minimum and 
subsidiary character of the ECHR should avoid a levelling down where EU 
law is more advanced than the non-discrimination law under the ECHR. 
On the level of soft law, the above-mentioned Handbook on European 
non-discrimination law jointly published by the EU’s Fundamental Rights 
Agency (FRA) and the Council of Europe’s ECtHR may be seen as an at-
tempt to bring the two legal orders closer to each other even before acces-
sion. 
Turning more specifically to LGBTI rights and non-discrimination, it has 
been seen that they came into the picture only gradually and that there are 
still important lacunae, in particular with respect to intersexual and 
transgender people. It is here that soft law can and should play an especially 
meaningful role. Against this background, the European Parliament’s adop-
tion, after the conclusion of this research, of a report calling on the Europe-
an Commission to adopt an EU Roadmap tackling homophobia, trans-
phobia and discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender 
identity (the “Lunacek Report”)160 is certainly welcome. 
                                                        
158  S. Besson (note 5), 676 et seq. 
159  S. Haverkort-Speekenbrink (note 7), 329. 
160  Report on the EU Roadmap against homophobia and discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation and gender identity, adopted on 4.2.2014, see <http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu>. 
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